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NOTE
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the problems fostered by racial discrimination in the United
States is that of inadequate housing available to members of minority
groups. General housing shortages are intensified for minority group
members because of special restrictions on the market in which they can
buy or rent. These restrictions are both economic and social. The nation's
lowest economic stratum contains more than its proportional share of
certain minority individuals;' and, generally speaking, they can seek only
the least expensive housing facilities. Added to this market-limiting factor
is the constriction resulting from the unwillingness of many people to sell
or rent to certain fellow citizens. The latter difficulty is not overcome once
a seller is found. Obtaining adequate financing where there is prejudice
is a further difficulty. But the burden of an ill-housed segment of our
society is not borne by minorities alone. The majority, too, suffers from
the resultant over-crowded, crime-breeding slums, cancroid ghettos, and
the resentment of the oppressed.
Although housing problems are but a symptom of an underlying sick-
ness, many lawmakers and social scientists are trying to extend immediate
relief to that symptom while awaiting the cure of its cause. Perhaps this
alleviation will itself help effectuate the ultimate cure. The lawmakers' ap-
proach has been by means of anti-bias housing legislation. This Note will
examine the nature of the laws that have been passed, and whom and how
they regulate. It will consider the validity of these laws and indicate where
they appear to fall short of constitutional requirements. The power and
propriety of municipalities passing anti-bias housing ordinances will also
be discussed. In considering the efforts of social scientists, attention will
be focused on a provocative plan for government enforced integration: the
"benign quota."
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS AGAINST DIScRIINATIONS
IN HOUSING
Discrimination in housing because of race, creed, color or national
origin may be said to have three sources: wholly private individuals, com-
pletely governmental action, and some combination of the two. As might
1. For example, 56.4% of non-white families earn less than $3,000.00 yearly,
while only 22.6% of white families fall into this category. U.S. BuREnAu OF CENsus,
DEV'T OF CoM MRCE, CuRRENT PoPULATIO REPoRTs No. 27, CoNsumER INcomE
table 12 (1958).
(515)
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be expected, the law is relatively clear in its application to the extremes.
Absent specific legislation, an individual who acquired property without
any form of governmental assistance may sell or lease completely at his
own pleasure.2  His power to do so cannot be infringed upon by third
parties even though he has entered into an agreement not to sell to anyone
of a particular race, creed, religion, or national origin. This was recog-
nized in Shelley v. Kraemer,3 1948, where the United States Supreme Court
held that state courts are prohibited by the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment from compelling compliance with restrictive
covenants. In 1953 the Court announced that the rule in the Shelley case
similarly applied to prohibit entertainment of a suit for damages based on
breach of a restrictive covenant. 4 One state court has interpreted these
decisions to mean that a private owner of realty who sells to a member of
an unwelcome ethnic group, and thus causes a decline in nearby property
values, may not be compelled to respond in damages to alleviate his former
neighbors' losses.5
However, there may well be limits to the freedom of an individual to
discriminatorily sell or lease property acquired without any form of gov-
ernmental assistance. Private owners of housing developments and large
apartment projects might be constrained, by law, from disposing of their
accommodations on a nondiscriminatory basis. The Supreme Court, in
Marsh v. Alabanw,6 suggested that a private person who has gained a
position of significant societal power and is performing the functions usually
performed by the government itself is subject to the proscriptions of the
fourteenth amendment.7 This case, however, dealt with the infringement
of the right of free speech of an entrant on the streets of a company-owned
town and not the disposition of the housing in the community. Further-
more, the size of the company town was such that perhaps only a few
commercial housing developments could rival it.8 What lesser degree of
"power position" will suffice to characterize the individual owner as a
"government" has yet to be explored by the Court. The one tribunal which
has been presented with the question found that the private owner of a
2. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 153, 154-55 (1950) ; cf. Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; see also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (applying
the same restriction to federal court action).
4. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
5. Stratton v. Conway, 301 S.W2d 332 (Tenn. 1957).
6. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
7. See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944) ; Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
213 (1956).
8. For example, some of the Levittown developments might fall within this cate-
gory. An action was instituted to force nondiscriminatory sale of homes in Levit-
town, Pa., but the opinion does not indicate that the Marsh doctrine was relied on by
the plaintiff. The action was dismissed on procedural grounds. Johnson v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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low-rental apartment project designed to accommodate some twenty-five
thousand persons was not of such proportions as would warrant applica-
tion of the Marsh doctrine.9
Although the governments' obligations with respect to sale and lease
of their own housing developments are now well defined, the present status
was preceded by a period of conflicting decisions. When the earliest cases
challenging the power of a state government to segregate in public housing
were being decided, two leading Supreme Court decisions supplied author-
ity, each for alternative conclusions. One was Plessy v. Ferguson,0 de-
cided in 1896. This case established the "separate but equal" doctrine and,
standing alone, seemed to allow the states to employ segregation policies
in their public housing. The other case was Buchanan v. Warley," a 1917
case which held that the fourteenth amendment was a bar to state enactment
of racial zoning regulations. Courts might have inferred from Buchanan
that segregated public housing was not permissible because it had the same
effect as racial zoning-restricting each race's living quarters to a separate
locale. Courts in Texas,2 Pennsylvania,' 3 and Arkansas,14 however, failed
to follow this reasoning, and, in the early 1940's, held that their respective
states could operate housing developments on a "separate but equal" basis.
The Shelley case was decided in 1948, and in banning state court enforce-
ment of restrictive racial covenants the case could have been taken to
indicate a further change in legal climate, eliminating states' power to
operate segregated housing projects. But Georgia 15 courts did not so
hold, and Texas ' 0 maintained the status quo on relitigation of the issue.
However, against the background of Buchanan and Shelley, a new line of
authority developed in New Jersey 17 in 1949 when that state rejected the
use of "separate but equal" facilities. Indiana,'- Ohio,19 and California 20
followed suit. The United States Supreme Court declined the opportunity
9. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E2d 541 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
10. 63 U.S. 537 (1896).
11. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
12. Housing Authority v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
13. Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
14. Denard v. Housing Authority, 203 Ark. 1050, 159 S.W2d 764 (1942).
15. West v. Housing Authority, 211 Ga. 133, 84 S.E.2d 30 (1954).
16. Miers v. Housing Authority, 266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.), certified
questions anrwered, 153 Tex. 236, 266 S.W.2d 842 (1954) (questions related to differ-
ent issues).
17. Seawell v. MacWhithey, 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (Ch.), rev'd and
remanded (because appeal indicated an absence of segregation or other discrimina-
tion), 2 N.J. 563, 67 A.2d 309 (1949). This case was followed in the more recent
case of Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Ch. 1954).
18. Woodbridge v. Evansville Housing Authority, Civil No. 618, S.D. Ind., July 6,
1953.
19. Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D.
Ohio 1953).
20. Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
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to resolve the conflict by denying certiorari in the California case.21  An
express decision, however, may have been unnecessary. Since the school
segregation cases, 22 every final state and lower federal court decision on
the merits of the question has denied the existence of state power to
provide "separate but equal" housing facilities. 5 The Supreme Court
itself, indicating the breadth of its decision, has interpreted the school
segregation cases to extend to public beaches and bath houses,24 public golf
courses 2 and state supported local transportation. 26 These opinions were
per curiam, laconically relying on each other and the school cases. They
did not require an array of psychological data which, in Brown v. Board
of Educ.,27 was ostensibly essential to the proof that separate schools were
not equal. The only implication to be drawn from the overwhelming weight
of decisions of both the Supreme Court and lower courts is that govern-
ment imposed segregation per se is a violation of the constitutional guar-
antees-that the "separate but equal" doctrine has been relegated, in theory
at least, to a position of solely historical significance.28
When government and private individuals combine in the production of
housing facilities, the question of whether the accommodations may be dis-
posed of on a discriminatory basis is far less settled. The fourteenth and
fifth amendments, by their terms, direct their commandments to the states
and Congress alone, while jointly-produced property is generally in the
hands of private individuals by the time of lease or sale. Since the Civil
Rights Cases,2 however, the concept of "state action" has been aggressively
expanded to apply the Constitution's proscriptions to the conduct of private
21. Housing Authority v. Banks, 347 U.S. 974 (1954). Views have been ex-
pressed that the denial means only, as customary, that the Supreme Court stands
uncommitted. Some think that since the case was before the Court at the same time
as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court denied certiorari because
the school case made the answer clear. Note, 31 IND. L.J. 501, 503 (1956).
22. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
23. Heyward v. Public Housing Administration, 238 F2d 689 (5th Cir. 1956),
dismissed on other grounds, 154 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Ga. 1957), argued sub nom.
Queen Cohen v. Savannah Housing Authority, 5th Cir., Jan. 30, 1958; Detroit Housing
Commission v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Eleby v. Louisville Municipal
Housing Comm'n, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 815 (1957) (W.D. Ky.); Askew v. Benton
Harbor Housing Comm'n, 2 RACE REL. L. REP. 611 (1957) (W.D. Mich. 1956);
Davis v. Housing Authority, 1 RAcE RE.. L. RaP. 353 (1956) (E.D. Mo. 1955);
Jones v. City of Hamtramck, 121 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Mich. 1954) ; Kankakee County
Housing Authority v. Spurlock, 3 IIl. 2d 277, 120 N.E2d 561 (1954) (senzble).
24. Mayor v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
25. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 79 Sup. Ct. 99 (1958);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n,
347 U.S. 971 (1954).
26. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. But see Dawley v. Norfolk, 159 F. Supp. 642, 648 (E.D. Va. 1958) (dictum);
Plummer v. Casey, 148 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Tex. 1955) (dictum) (suggesting the
constitutionality of "separate but equal" facilities in courthouse cafeteria), aff'd,
240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956) (not discussing the "separate but equal" dictum), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957).
29. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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persons who, because of their powerful community position or because of
the relationship of themselves or their activities to the government, "can
be fairly said" 3 0 to be acting for or as the state. No single phrase may
adequately describe the variety of rationales which is implicit in the judicial
applications of this doctrine, but one view that may be of particular sig-
nificance to the housing question is that persons, who have been aided by
the power of the state to perform an activity, cannot use methods prohibited
to the government itself. In Shelley v. Kraemer,,
3 previously discussed,3 2
the Supreme Court declared that restrictive covenants entered into by
private persons were unenforceable. Noting that Buchanan v. Warley
3 3
refused the government authority to zone land into restrictive areas, the
Court held that the states might not indirectly achieve that end through the
medium of apparently private persons.
This attitude was more fully expressed in the concurring opinion in
the later case of Steele v. Louisville & Nashzvlle R.R.3 4 The issue pre-
sented to the Court was whether a union, statutorily recognized as the
bargaining agent of a group of employees by the Railway Labor Actas
might validly bargain with the employer for a hiring and promotion program
designed to eliminate negroes from the working force. A majority of the
Court held the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement invalid,
basing its decision on an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act as re-
quiring the recognized union to represent all employees in its unit fairly
and equally and to refrain from bargaining for provisions which served
only discriminatory purposes. Justice Murphy, concurring, found the case
to be governed, not merely by the statute involved, but also by the principle
that the union, having gained its power and position by force of the federal
government, was constitutionally constrained to conduct itself as the Gov-
ernment must 30 Subsequently, a majority of the Court in American
Communications Ass'n v. Douds,3 7 alluding to the Steele decision, stated:
"But power is never without responsibility. And when authority derives
in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that power
by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by
Government itself." 38
A number of state and lower federal courts have applied the doctrine
to cases of discriminatory conduct by private persons who control prop-
erty, the construction or maintenance of which has been aided by the state.
30. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). For a detailed analysis of the
different rationales by which the courts determine "state action" to exist see Shanks,
"State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 213 (1956).
31. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
32. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
33. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
34. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
35. 44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952).
36. 323 U.S. at 208-09.
37. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
38. 339 U.S. at 401.
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A case frequently cited for this proposition is Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free
Pub. Library.3 9 This case involved a library given to Baltimore on condi-
tion that the city contribute operational funds. In compliance with the
terms of the grant the library was run by an incorporated board of trustees
which made annual reports to the city. It was decided that the library
could not exclude plaintiff, because of her color, from the library's employee
training school. One commentator analyzes this and similar cases 4 in
terms of "piercing technical forms," 41 i.e., disregarding the appearances of
private management to find government direction toward a purpose which
it could not have accomplished through its own public agencies. Recogniz-
ing the pervasive influence of government on all private activities, this line
of reasoning would seem to call for a factual inquiry into the quantum of
government promotion of the particular activity. In the area of housing
facilities, "direct" government assistance in the form of cash subsidy, tax
exemption, and exercise of the powers of eminent domain for the acquisition
of property then transferred to private ownership provide the closest
analogies to the above cases which found state action. As the form of public
"aid" moves across the spectrum, e.g., to guaranty of mortgage loans, the
promotional aspects of the government itself become far more attenuated
and less reasonably described as the government accomplishing a purpose
through the guise of private persons. It is hardly suggested that a "but
for" relationship between the individual's societal power position and the
state assistance need be established, but something more than police and
fire protection is obviously demanded.
Only two courts have been squarely presented with the question in the
field of housing. The New York Court of Appeals in Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
Town Corp.42 refused to require the admission of negroes to a low-rental
housing project constructed and owned by a private corporation. The
project had received substantial assistance from both the state and the
municipality in the form of millions of dollars of tax exemption, condemna-
tion through the power of eminent domain, and sale to the corporation of
public streets in exchange for property surrounding the project. In addi-
39. 149 F2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
40. Another common example is the municipally constructed swimming pool
which is leased to a private corporation for operation. See Lawrence v. Hancock,
76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Kern v. City Comm'rs, 151 Kan. 565, 100
P2d 709 (1940) (mandamus denied for reasons immaterial here); Culver v. City
of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948). While some of these trans-
actions were obvious shams with nominal rental and extensive continuing government
control, such as in Lawrenwe and Culver, others, such as Kern, represented bona fide
relinquishment of control by the city to enter into a genuinely profitable leasing
arrangement. See also Department of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956). It has been suggested that these cases
might, in the alternate, be analyzed in terms of the doctrines of general municipal
law, i.e., a municipality may not put publicly owned property to other than public use.
See City & County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955).
41. Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. P.&. L. Rzv. 213,
229 (1956).
42. 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). For
a discussion of this case see Note, 33 NovaT DA E LAw. 463, 469-72 (1958).
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
tion to this substantial physical aid, the local governments exercised a
significant amount of managerial control over the operation of the project,
fixing maximum rents and profits, and prescribing careful limitations with
respect to financing, disposing of the property, and altering of structures.
The court distinguished previously decided "state action" cases on the
theory that "they disclose the exertion of governmental power directly to
aid in discrimination," 43 while the government promotion here bore only the
character of being "indirect, . . . helpful co-operation." 44
One aspect of the factual situation in Dorsey which may be relevant
to a complete analysis of the case is that the Stuyvesant Corporation, while
negotiating with the government authorities, expressly declared that it could
not consider making the necessary investment were it to be required to
rent to non-white tenants. After considerable debate the contract was
concluded without provision for the selection of tenants. This action was
understood by the court 4 5 to indicate a bargain by the government not to
interfere with this aspect of Stuyvesant's management of the project. The
corporation relied on this bargain by investing not less than $90 million of
its private funds. Of course, the government's commitment, if in contra-
diction to constitutional proscriptions, could have no legal effect,46 but the
ominous flavor of "confiscation" which would be created by a decision com-
pelling Stuyvesant to employ so sizable a private investment in a venture
which the owner had expressly considered insecure and from which there
was now no withdrawing is readily apparent. Supreme Court exposition of
the "state action" concept is clearly in a developmental stage, and hesitance
of the state tribunal to extend it without direct commandment is somewhat
understandable.
Diametrically opposed to the Dorsey decision, however, is Ming v.
Horgan,4 7 recently decided by the Superior Court of California. Con-
sidering the spectrum of governmental relationships which might be pre-
sented in the field of housing facilities, the fact situation here approaches
the most attenuated limits. In this case suit was brought to enjoin a project
developer from discriminating in the disposition of his property which was
wholly privately constructed and financed. Granting the relief requested,
the court found the requisite governmental relationship in the fact that the
developer's houses were approved for Federal Housing Administration
financing to buyers. A ready market was created for the seller which would
not otherwise have been available, and thus the federal authorities had
sufficiently joined in the production of the facilities to require that equal
opportunity be afforded all prospective purchasers. Certainly if this degree
of public assistance is adequate to create the requisite state relationship, the
43. 299 N.Y. at 533, 87 N.E.2d at 550. (Emphasis added.)
44. 299 N.Y. at 535, 87 N.E.2d at 551.
45. 299 N.Y. at 529, 87 N.E2d at 547.
46. See 299 N.Y. at 544-45, 87 N.E.2d at 556-57 (dissenting opinion).
47. 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 693 (1958) (Cal. Super. Ct.).
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buyer who is personally granted an FHA credit guarantee in order to obtain
property ownership would be included within the ambit of the "state
action" concept.
The propriety of construing such governmental benefits as financing
assurance to indicate the employment of a private individual as the state's
conduit for action is questionable. At some point the substantiality of the
particular government aid and control should cease to be the controlling
factor, and inquiry turn to the universality with which the assistance is dis-
pensed. Hardly a person today is not the recipient of some direct govern-
ment bounty. Farmers, veterans, aged, small businesses, large business,
and prospective home buyers, to allude to but a few, all partake of personal
assistance from the welfare treasury. To extend by judicial construction
the commandments of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the population
in general is to distort constitutional language.
III. LEGISLATION
In recent years a number of states and municipalities have enacted
legislation designed to make more housing facilities available to minority
groups.48 In the main, these laws have related solely to public housing
projects, providing that such facilities shall be available for occupancy by
families without regard to race, color, creed or national origin, and that
applicants shall not be subject to discrimination or segregation of any
kind. 9 A few states and one municipality, however, have broadened the
scope of their legislation so as to prohibit discriminatory practices in the
sale or rental of private properties. The provisions of these latter laws
vary in a number of significant respects and are therefore discussed
in some detail.
Persons Regulated
In general the statutes which prohibit the discriminatory sale or rental
of private housing employ two criteria to determine the applicability of
their proscriptions to a particular person. The existence of governmental
assistance is in many cases necessary.50 This criterion is frequently further
subdivided to distinguish between those who receive "direct" assistance,51
e.g., cash subsidy, tax exemption, purchase from the state of the property
at less than cost, or assemblance of the land by the state through its power
of condemnation, and those who receive only indirect assistance such as
48. A compilation of legislation enacted up to October 1957 may be found in
U.S. HOUSING & HOME FINANCE AGENCY, NONDIScRIMINATION CLAUSES IN REGARD
TO PuBLIc HOUSING, PRIVATE HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT UNDERTAKINGS
(rev. ed. 1957).
49. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 121, §26FF (1957), amended by MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1, 4 (Supp. 1957); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §28.343 (Supp. 1957);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §462.481 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §1664 (Supp.
1957).
50. See note 48 supra.
51. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1 (Supp. 1957) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-5
(Supp. 1958); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 18-b; N.Y. EXECUTnV LAW § 29Z
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
loan guaranty5 2  A further basis for distinction found in several statutes
is the requirement that the housing be of a commercial nature.53 Either
or both of these criteria may be used in a particular statute to designate
those subject to its prohibitions.
More specifically, the Massachusetts 54 and New York 55 statutes con-
strain all home owners to act nondiscriminatorily if they receive direct aid,
and also subject the commercial real estate owner to regulation if he is
the recipient of indirect assistance. The New Jersey statute 5 6 regulates
all real estate owners regardless of the noncommercial nature of the hold-
ings and only indirect government assistance is necessary. The Oregon 57
act applies only to landowners who deal in housing facilities on a commer-
cial basis, and then only if they have received certain forms of direct or
indirect governmental aid. The remaining two statutes which purport to
regulate discrimination in private housing vary from the above pattern.
The Connecticut statute 53 does not predicate its application upon any
specific form of governmental assistance, providing that "all persons within
the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal accommoda-
tions in every place of public accommodation. . ." 59 A "place of public
accommodation" is defined as "any establishment, including, but not limited
to, public housing projects and all other forms of publicly assisted housing,
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general
public." 60 The Connecticut Commission on Civil Rights has ruled that
even a real estate agent operates an establishment which offers its services
to the general public and is therefore subject to the statute. 1 Were this
interpretation to be accepted by the courts, it would seem that apartment
house owners and project developers are also within the purview of the
enactment. The New York City Ordinance12 controls the conduct of
owners of commercial housing without regard to the receipt of any form
of governmental assistance.
52. MASS. ANN. LAvs ch. 151B, § 1 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-5
(Supp. 1958); N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 18-b; N.Y. EXEcuT=E LAWv § 292; ORE.
REv. STAT. § 659.032 (1957).
53. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 1 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. Crv. R GHTS LAw
§18-b; N.Y. ExECuTvIE LAw § 292; ORE. REv. STAT. §659.032 (Supp. 1957). As
used here a commercial owner of property is one who owvtns either a "multiple
dwelling" or a number of contiguous homes. A "multiple dwelling" house may be
defined as "a dwelling which is occupied, as a rule, for permanent residence purposes
and which is either rented, leased, let or hired out, to be occupied as the residence
or home of three or more families living independently of each other." N.Y. Civ.
RIGHTS LAW § 18-b.
54. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, §§ 1, 4 (Supp. 1957).
55. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 18-b; N.Y. ExEcuTIV LAW § 292.
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-5 (Supp. 1958).
57. On. REv. STAT. § 659.032 (Supp. 1957).
58. CONN. GEN. STAT. §2464c (Supp. 1953).
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. See U.S. HOUSING & HOME FINANCE AGENcY, NONDISCRIMINATION CLAUSES
IN REGARD TO PUBLIC HousING, PuvATE HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
UNDERTAKINGS 16 (rev. ed. 1957).
62. Nmv YoRK, N.Y., ADMINISTRAMVE CODE § X41-1.0 (Supp. 1958).
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Discriminatory Practices Prohibited
The primary purpose of anti-discrimination laws is to enable minority
group members to acquire and to enjoy the benefits of adequate housing.
To this end all these laws make it illegal for a person subject to the law
"to refuse to rent or lease or otherwise to deny to or withhold from any
person or group of persons" housing accommodations because of the race,
creed, color or national origin of such persons.6 A property owner, how-
ever, though not refusing to rent or lease to those minorities, may effectively
exclude them by advertising or making it known that his property will
not be available to the minority group members.64 This type of restrictive
advertising is likewise prohibited by some laws.es Furthermore, the laws
follow the minority group member even after he acquires accommodations,
all of them providing that a landlord or property owner may not dis-
criminate in the furnishing of services to tenants.66 However, proscriptions
against the housing supplier are often not sufficient alone to enable minority
group members to acquire the housing. Financial assistance for a purchase
may also be discriminately withheld.67 New Jersey, by amendment of its
Savings and Loan Act 6 8 and its Banking Act,6 9 has expressly provided
that the granting of mortgage loans shall be without regard to race, creed,
color, national ancestry or origin, nor shall there be discrimination as to
the terms of such loans.
Enforcement Procedures
While one law permits a person discriminated against direct access to
the courts, 0 most provide that relief must first be sought before an ad-
63. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4 (Supp. 1957). Similar in effect are the
following laws: N.J. STAT. ANY. § 18:25-4 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. EXECUTVE LAW
§ 296; Opx. REv. STAT. § 659.033 (Supp. 1957); WASH. R v. CODE § 49.60 (Supp.
1957). See also NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § X41-1.0 (Supp. 1958).
This Connecticut law provides that: "any denial of such accommodation by reason of
race, creed or color of the applicant therefor shall be a violation of the provisions of
this section. Any discrimination, segregation or separation, on account of race, creed or
color, shall be a violation of this section." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2464c (Supp. 1953).
64. Cf. N.Y. EXEcUTnvE LAW § 296: "It shall be an . . . unlawful discrimina-
tory practice . . . for any . . . owner . . . to publish, circulate . . . any written
or printed communication, notice, or advertisement, to the effect that any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any such place shall be
refused, withheld from or denied to any person on account of . . . race, creed, color.
.. See also MAss. ANN. LAwS ch. 151B, §4 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§18:25-12 (Supp. 1958); Om,. Rv. STAT. § 659.033 (1957).
65. Ibd.
66. See note 63 supra.
67. See ABRAs, FoRBiDDEN NEIGHBORS 369 (1955). Many white financiers feel
that negroes are not a good credit risk. However, at least one banker has stated
that he has found negroes to be as good a credit risk as whites. See Letter From
E. B. Schwulst of the Bowery Savings Bank to Mrs. Thomas F. McAllister, March
26, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
68. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-69 (Supp. 1958).
69. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:12A-78 (Supp. 1958).
70. N.Y. Crw. RIGHTs LAW § 18d.
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ministrative agency.71 The administrative body acquires jurisdiction when
an aggrieved person,72 the commission 73 or the Attorney General 74 of the
state submits a complaint to the commission alleging that the statute has
been violated. Probably the most important step in the procedure occurs
after a preliminary investigation of the substance of the complaint. If this
investigation indicates that the unlawful acts may have occurred, the
commissioner will attempt to eliminate the practice by means of persuasion
and conciliation.75 Should this informal method fail, a written notice will
issue, requiring the alleged violator to answer the charges of the complaint
at a later hearing.76 If the evidence at the hearing discloses that the law
has been violated, the commission. will issue a cease and desist order.7 7
Under some statutes the commissioner is empowered further to require
affirmative action by the violator, e.g., that the violator rent or sell his prop-
erty to the aggrieved party.78  Provision is also made for judicial review
should either party contest the decision of the commission.
79
Constitutionality
The states predicate their authority to enact legislation of this nature
on their police power.8 0 The police power, which is said to be the least
limitable of state powers,8 ' extends to the enactment of all legislation which
71. "There is created in the State Department of Education a division to be
known as 'The Division Against Discrimination' with power to prevent and eliminate
discrimination." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-6 (Supp. 1958). See also CoNN. GEN.
STAT. §2465c (Supp. 1953); MAss. ANrr. LAws ch. 151B, §5 (Supp. 1957); N.Y.
EXEcUTIVE LAW § 293; ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.045 (1957).
72. CoNr. GEN STAT. § 7406 (1949); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 2465c (Supp. 1953);
MASS. Am. LAws ch. 151B, §5 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANY. § 18:25-13 (Supp.
1958) ; N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 297; ORE. REV. STAT. § 659.045 (1957); NLv YoRK,
N.Y., ADMINISTRArV CODE §X41-1.0(c) (Supp. 1958).
73. MAss. AiN. LAws ch. 151B, §5 (Supp. 1957) ; N.J. STAT. AN. § 18:25-13
(Supp. 1958); NEW YoRx, N.Y., ADmimsTRATIVE CODE §X41-1.0(c) (Supp. 1958).
74. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 151B, §5 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:25-13 (Supp. 1958); Or. Rwv. STAT. § 659.045 (1957).
75. CoNr. Gm~. STAT. § 7406 (1949) ; CoN. GEN. STAT. § 2465c (Supp. 1953);
MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 5 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:25-14 (Supp.
1958); N.Y. EXEC-rr= LAW § 297; Oar. REv. STAT. § 659.050 (1957); NEW YoRK,
N.Y., AumISTRATIVE CODE § X41-1.0(c) (Supp. 1958).
76. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7406 (1949); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §2465c (Supp. 1953);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 1513, §5 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:25-15 (Supp.
1958) ; N.Y. ExctIVr LAw § 297; ORE. REv. STAT. § 659.060 (1957).
77. CoDN. GEN. STAT. § 7406 (1949) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2465c (Supp. 1953);
MAss. ANN. LAws cl. 151B, §5 (Supp. 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. §18:25-17 (Supp.
1958); N.Y. ExECUTIVE LAw §297; ORE. REV. STAT. §659.060 (1957).
78. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-17 (Supp. 1958) ; N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 297.
79. MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 6 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:25-21
(Supp. 195); N.Y. ExEcuTIVE LAW §298; Qar. REv. STAT. §659.080 (1957).
80. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18:25-2 (Supp. 195): "The enactment hereof
shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the State for the protection of the
public safety, health and morals and to promote the general welfare and in fulfillment
of the provisions of the Constitution of this state guaranteeing civil rights."
81. Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946).
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is reasonably necessary for the public health, safety, morals and general
welfare. The trend of Supreme Court decisions has been to extend the
definition of "general welfare" so that today there is hardly a public need
of any sort which may not serve to justify state legislative action. 2 Broad
as the police power may be, however, it is not without constitutional
boundaries. In doctrinal terms, the regulation must be "reasonably neces-
sary" and "reasonably related" to the purported public purpose. What
seems operative in the decisions is that when the legislation, designed for
admittedly desirable ends, imposes a comparatively great burden on the
individual liberties or property rights of a relatively limited class of the
population, the government action will be struck down as violative of the
"due process" commandment of the fourteenth amendment.83
The public need for anti-discrimination legislation is readily apparent.
The New York City ordinance, for example, declares in its preamble:
"In the City of New York, with its great cosmopolitan population
consisting of large numbers of people of every race, color, religion,
national origin and ancestry, many persons have been compelled to
live in circumscribed sections under substandard, unhealthful, un-
sanitary and crowded living conditions because of discrimination and
segregation in housing. These conditions have caused increased
mortality, morbidity, delinquency, risk of fire, intergroup tension, loss
of tax revenue and other evils." 84
The double-edged purpose of these laws is to open up a new market for
homes to members of minority groups who are able to afford them, and at
the same time to wage a frontal attack against slum areas, which are caused
in part by the inability of great numbers of persons to purchase or rent
elsewhere. It has been suggested, however, by some disputants of the
validity of this legislation that the means which the state has chosen are
not reasonably adapted to attain these public ends.8 The argument is
fairly doomed when uttered. The standard which the courts apply to such
82. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) ; Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948), indicating the interrelation of the "due process" and "equal protection"
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. No longer does the Court make exacting inquiry
into the existence and extent of the public need for the legislation in question, par-
ticularly with respect to legislation not affecting those special rights expressly pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights; and in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the
contrary the legislative judgment is accepted. Compare, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U.S. 1 (1915), striking down a state law which prohibited employers from
discriminating against unionized employees, with Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. North-
western Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), holding similar legislation valid.
84. N-w YoRi, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CoDE § X41-1.0(a) (Supp. 1958).
85. See Brief for Respondents, p. 19, State Comm'n Against Discrimination v.
Pelham Hall Apartments, 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S2d 750 (Sup. Ct 1958).
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a question is far from a demand of certitude of success by the state, but only
some reasonable relation between the means and the legislative goal.8 6 The
states are free "to experiment with new techniques," 87 and the virtually im-
possible burden of showing the law to be incapable of accomplishing its
purpose is upon the party attacding validity.
Turning now to the more significant inquiry in determining the con-
stitutionality of legislation of this type, i.e., what injuries are suffered by
the class of persons who must bear its burden, it is argued that the regula-
tion unduly restricts the right of private property owners to choose the
persons with whom they will deal.88 The laws, however, do not deprive
the seller or lessor of the opportunity to transact his business. They merely
require that he sell or rent at any price satisfactory to him, but without
regard to the race, color or creed of the offeree. The fact that a potential
purchaser or lessee is of a particular minority group would seem to be a
factor wholly irrelevant to legitimate commercial purposes, and obligatory
disregard of it not an overly severe infringement on the liberty to contract.
The argument, however, is more forcefully put forward that the regula-
tion will unjustly deprive property owners of property value, especially
in high cost and presently "exclusive" neighborhoods, if they are forced to
admit "undesirable persons." This objection has little relevance to the
individual home owner, for his value is preserved in the price agreed upon
and after the sale he relinquishes all interest in the property. Surrounding
landowners might suffer some diminution in value, but the Supreme Court
has implied that they have no interest in their neighbor's property. Shelley
v. Kraener,s previously discussed,90 put to rest the question of the en-
forceability of restrictive covenants, and would seem to control here.91
There is some evidence, however, that the apartment house owner and the
project developer, who have protected interests, will experience a loss in
value if compelled to sell or rent to members of minority groups who are
subject to community prejudice. Whether this loss would rise to the height
of an unconstitutional "taldng" by the state is questionable. All changes
in the general law cause some disturbance of previously enjoyed personal
86. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
87. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952). See also
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932) : "When the subject lies within the
police power of the State, debatable questions as to the reasonableness are not for
the courts but for the legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment. . . .
88. Statement by James Andrews of the Real Estate Board of New York at a
Meeting of the Board of Estimate, Dec. 19, 1957: 'We have opposed this bill since it
first was introduced in the City Council. We have opposed it primarily because it
deprives property owners of a fundamental right. When I say fundamental, I mean
a right fundamental to all other rights. When government can tell property owners
what to do with their properties, it can influence free press, free assemblage, and even
free religion."
89. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
90. See text and notes accompanying note 3 supra.
91. See text accompanying note 3 suPra.
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rights,92 and it is only the serious invasion which seems to tip the balance
which the courts apply. At one time it was a fairly well accepted proposi-
tion that the presence of negroes in a previously all-white community or
apartment dwelling would cause a substantial decrease in the price which
surrounding houses or apartments could command. 3  The FHA formerly
followed a policy of attempting to maintain the "purity" of certain neigh-
borhoods, presumably under the theory that this action was necessary to
protect against loss of security on the loans guaranteed by it.°4 Today
the FHA has altered its practices, even to the point of offering to take
active steps to cooperate in the development of open-occupancy projects.9 5
Furthermore, some recent statistical studies tend to indicate that significant
deterioration of market prices does not follow changes in neighborhood
racial patterns.96 This is said to be true even in the high-cost areas where
the injury might have been supposed to be the greatest. 7 In addition it
should be noted, especially with respect to owners of multiple dwellings, that
the anti-discrimination legislation does not impose upon private owners
the common-law duty of public hostelries. The only requirement is that the
standards of admittance to accommodations adopted by the owner be uni-
versally applied without reference to race, creed, color or national ancestry.
In the last analysis, the scantiness of reliable evidence as to the extent of
injury which property owners might incur would seem to indicate that
their burden of proof, as disputants of constitutional validity, could hardly
be sustained in the face of the legislative determination of need and de-
sirability.
There is little to be found in the way of judicial guidance on the precise
problem of the validity of state anti-discrimination statutes directed at
92. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
93. See ABERCROMBiE, How To BuY OR BUILD YOUR HoME WISELY 14, 18 (1941);
MAY, THE VALUATION OF RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 75 (1942).
94. See ABRAms, FORnmDEN NEIGHBORS 229-30 (1955) : "FHA adopted a racial
policy that could well have been culled from the Nuremberg laws. From its inception
FHA set itself up as the protector of the all-white neighborhood. It sent its agents
into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities from buying homes in white
neighborhoods. It exerted pressure against builders who dared to build for minorities,
and against lenders willing to lend on mortgages. This official agency not only kept
Negroes in their place but pointed at Chinese, Mexicans, American Indians, and
other minorities as well. It not only insisted on social and racial 'homogeneity' in
all of its projects as the price of insurance but became the vanguard of white
supremacy and racial purity-in the North as well as the South."
95. See Address by Norman P. Mason, Federal Housing Administration Com-
missioner, Before Luncheon Conference of Government and Business Leadership for
Better Housing Opportunities, New York, N.Y., June 24, 1958.
96. LAURENTI, EFFEcrs OF NONWHITE PURCHASES ON MARKEr PRICES OF RESI-
DENCES (1952). MORGAN, VALUES IN TRANSITION AREAS: SOME NEW CONCEPTS 6
(1956). The great shortcoming of Laurenti's first study is that it included data
collected only in the San Francisco area. A second much more comprehensive study
by the same person, however, corroborates the findings of the first study. Unfortu-
nately, this second report has not yet been published and is, therefore, not in general
circulation.
97. LAURENT, EFFECTS OF NONWHITE PURCHASES ON MARKEr PRICES OF REsi-
DENCES (1952). But see MORGAN, VALUES IN TRANSITION AREAS: SOME NEw
CoNcEP'Ts 6 (1956).
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private landowners 9 8 In Railway Mail Ass'n. v. Corsi,9 9 the Supreme
Court considered the validity of an anti-discrimination statute which re-
quired that labor unions admit all applicants to membership without regard
to race, creed, color or national origin. Rejecting the argument that the
law abridged the union's property rights and liberty of contract, the Court
stated:
"A judicial determination that such legislation violated the Four-
teenth Amendment would be a distortion of the policy manifested in
that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation de-
signed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color." 100
Labor unions, holding themselves out as representatives of the bargaining
unit, are required to represent all members of the unit fairly and equally.10 1
Minority groups, by definition, are likely to be too small to form separate
organizations which would be effective in securing settlement of their
individual grievances and in obtaining their group aims with respect to
conditions of employment. To secure to them the adequate representation
which they require and which would be beneficial to the common good of
industrial peace, it was held to be fully within the power of the states to
demand that they be granted a voice in the operation of the employees'
bargaining organizations. The interests of labor unions in retaining their
private prejudices was summarily dismissed as insubstantial in comparison
with the public benefit to be derived from the legislation in question.
Although the Court's discussion in this case finds ready application
to the question of the right of private property owners to be free to contract
for the disposition of their accommodations, no genuine issue of loss of
property rights was presented by the union. Closer analogy is found in the
case of District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.,' 2 dealing with a
local law prohibiting discrimination by restaurateurs. There the argument
must have been pressed that the obligation to serve negroes would result in
98. But see Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 253 U.S. 242 (1922); Block v. Hirsh,
256 U.S. 135 (1921). In these cases the constitutionality of local rent control legis-
lation was upheld. The effect of the laws was to prohibit a landlord from evicting
a tenant whose lease had expired, so long as the tenant continued to adhere to the
provisions of the old lease.
99. 326 U.S. 83 (1945).
100. 326 U.S. at 93-94. See also concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
"A state may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished claims of
American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's
hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would
stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private
prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations like those now before us, ought
not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to
extend the area of non-discrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself
exacts." 326 U.S. at 98.
101. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525 (1949); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
102. 346 U.S. 100 (1953). See also Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S.
28, 34 (1947) ; Westen Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907) ; Messinger v.
State, 25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889).
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financial loss for the restaurant owner in that his white clientele would refuse
him patronage. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the regulation, relying on
Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, and cryptically announcing that "certainly
so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned there is no doubt that legis-
lation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the use of
facilities serving a public function is within the police power of the
states." 103 It might be argued that these decisions have no application to
housing legislation because private home owners, unlike labor organiza-
tions and restaurants, serve no traditional "public function." Indeed there
is language, particularly in the Corsi decision,104 to the effect that the
persons regulated by the state become amenable to such control because
they "hold themselves out" as serving the public. What would seem
operative in these decisions, however, is not some form of "misrepresenta-
tion" on the part of the persons regulated that they will serve the general
public while in reality turning away a segment of it, but an undertaking
by individuals to engage in a form of commerce the benefits of which should
not, in the public welfare, be withheld from minority groups. The focus
seems to be on the need for the commerce or activity to be "public" rather
than the intent of the dealer or home owner to make it so. The peculiarity
of the housing market is that the great bulk of available accommodations is
not concentrated in the hands of real estate entrepreneurs, but is owned
by individuals as their sole residences. The need to make housing available
to members of minority groups would seem to impress the requisite "public
function," then, on all those who control the market. The only court
which has passed on any of these housing measures is a New York trial
court.10 5 The statute 106 was attacked by the owner of a multiple dwelling
who had obtained FHA guaranty of his mortgage loan. The law was
held to be valid.
Classification
Assuming that a state has the constitutional power to prohibit dis-
crimination by all persons who own property which is sold or leased as
living quarters, may the state limit the scope of its enactment to a particular
group of property owners? The two major problems which are presented
by many of the state laws are (1) the differentiation in treatment which
they accord "commercial" property owners and individual home owners,
and (2) the differentiation between those who receive government aid and
those who do not. The doctrinal approach of the courts is that a par-
ticular classification is not violative of the "equal protection" clause of the
fourteenth amendment so long as the characteristics of the classes are such
103. 346 U.S. at 109.
104. 326 U.S. at 94.
105. State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments, 10 Misc.
2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1958). See also note 98 supra.
106. Described in text accompanying note 55 supra.
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that the variations in treatment have some relation to the desired ends
of the law.1'0 7 The relationship, however, need not be particularly sub-
stantial; in recent decisions the judicial inquiry in large part has been
restricted to indications of "invidious discrimination" by the legislatures.10 8
Restricting operation of an anti-discrimination law to owners of
multiple dwellings and project developers appears to meet this minimal
standard. While it may not be supposed that such persons discriminate
to any greater degree than uncontrolled property owners, the states might
nonethetless reasonably consider the need for regulation of this class to be
greater. This group, including the greater number of lessors, offers that
type of accommodation most in demand by members of minority groups.
Furthermore, a factor peculiarly applicable to the developer of new projects
is that, by opening newly constructed mass housing accommodations to
minority groups, the pattern in interracial living will be more readily
established in the whole community. Finally, these tvo classes, the
"commercial" and the single-residence owners, are not in competition with
each other to any very substantial extent, so that no genuine question of
"invidious discrimination" is presented by this classification.
The second question, whether there may be reasonable classification
between recipients and nonrecipients of governmental assistance, presents
a more difficult problem. It must first be considered that regulation of
recipients of government aid is not an imposition by the state under its
police power but merely a declaration of the recipient's constitutional duty.
As discussed previously,10 9 the argument has been made that persons whose
activities are directly supported by the government take on the attribute
of the state for the purposes of applying the "equal protection" command-
ment. The serious question is whether the concept of "state action" by the
individual may be stretched so far as to include the great number of land-
owners governmentally assisted, and secondarily whether the less direct
relationship created by the guaranty of a loan may be sufficient to create
the requisite governmental relationship even were the doctrine to be prop-
erly applicable to recipients of direct subsidy. As noted, judicial decisions
are conflicting, although one lower state court which has considered the
issue concluded that even FHA or Veterans Administration loan guaranty
to the buyer was sufficient to impose constitutional restrictions on the
private seller.110
Should it be finally determined that government aid to individuals or
at least some forms of government aid are insufficient to form the basis for
regulation, the statutory scheme may then only be justified by the police
power; and the question of reasonable classification is squarely presented.
It is difficult to discover the peculiar characteristics of such a class which
107. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
108. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955), with which con-
pare Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
109. See notes 29-46 stepra and accompanying text.
110. Ming v. Horgan, 3 RAcE REL. L. RPi. 693 (1958) (Cal. Super. Ct.).
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would have any significance in relation to the purposes of the law. Fur-
thermore, the fact that members of both classes are in competition with
each other invites inquiry as to "invidious discrimination," for any com-
mercial disadvantage which may flow from obligatory sale or rental to
members of minority groups will discriminate in favor of their unregulated
competitors. When presented with this question in State Conmn'n Against
Discrimination v. Pelham Hall Apartments,'" the New York Supreme
Court justified the classification on the basis of the "step-at-a-time" rule
formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co." 2 This doctrine recognizes the right of a state to carve out
of a group of persons, similarly situated, a class whose activities or numbers
are such as to create a greater need for immediate regulation than the
balance of the group. "[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind." "a In Williamson the Court applied the rule to uphold an Okla-
homa statute which prohibited any unlicensed optometrist to fit lenses to a
face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances
except on prescriptive authority of a state licensed ophthalmologist or
optician. Attack was made on the theory that those persons who sold
ready-to-wear eyeglasses were unregulated and thus a discriminatory
burden was placed on dealers in custom-prepared spectacles. The short
answer which the Court made to this contention was: "For all this record
shows, the ready-to-wear branch of this business may not loom large in
Oklahoma or may present problems of regulation distinct from the other
branch." 114 The need here for limited regulation was assumed in the
absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary. Although the case may be
analyzed in part in terms of a failure of advocacy, i.e., failure to present
persuasively the similarity of position of both the regulated and unregulated
in terms of immediate hazard to the public good, it is tenable to suppose
that at some point the Court will refuse to indulge in the presumption of
the legislature's having determined some rational factual distinction which
is not suggested by the statute itself or by common knowledge." 5 The
111. 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct 1958).
112. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). See also Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608
(1935); Note, 12 RuTGERs L. REv. 557, 568 (1958).
113. 348 U.S. at 489.
114. Ibid.
115. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) ; Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S.
459 (1937), where the court held unconstitutional a law prohibiting stock insurance
companies from writing or issuing a policy to a customer solicited by a salaried
employee but permitting this to mutual companies. The Court refused to strain its
ingenuity to find a rational justification for the legislative classification. The Court
said: "We can discover no reasonable basis for permitting mutual insurance companies
to act through salaried resident employees and exclude stock companies from the
same privilege. If there were any such basis, it would have been discovered by the
state courts." 301 U.S. at 463. But cf. Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1946),
where the Court held constitutional a loan making it possible for the selection of
river and ocean pilots to be based primarily upon familial relationships with existing
pilots.
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question then becomes whether it is reasonable to believe that the state
may have found a greater need to control discrimination by governmentally
assisted property owners than by those wholly privately financed. It is
suggested that here the notion that the former class conducts itself with
more prejudice toward minority groups than the latter, or that the former
is so numerically superior as to consider the hazard to the public good
created by the wholly private group insignificant, is entirely unacceptable.
The Pelham Apartments case, however, serves to emphasize the onerous
burden of proof and advocacy placed upon disputants of this type of welfare
legislation.
IV. ANTI-BIAS LEGISLATION AND THE MUNICIPALITY
Assuming that the states have power to legislate against discriminatory
practices in private housing, consideration turns to whether subdivisions of
the state can and should enter this field. Attention is directed primarily to
Philadelphia 116 because issues raised with respect to that city are common
to many other municipalities.
Pennsylvania's constitution provides that "cities of any particular class,
may be given the . . . power to frame and adopt their own charters and
to exercise the powers . . . of local self-government, subject . . . to
such . . . regulations as may be imposed by the Legislature." " 7 Pur-
suant to this provision, the legislature passed the First Class City Home
Rule Act,118 giving Philadelphia, upon its adoption of a charter:
"all powers and authority of local self-government and . . . complete
powers of legislation and administration in relation to its municipal
functions. . . . The Charter of any city . . may provide . .
for the exercise of any and all powers relating to its municipal func-
tions . . . to the full extent that the General Assembly may legis-
late in reference thereto as to cities of the first class. . .. " 119
These powers are constrained, however, by a succeeding section of the act,
which, inter alia, prohibits cities from exercising the powers in conflict with
a state act "applicable in every part" or "to all cities of the Common-
wealth." 120 Since the legislature has passed no act relating to anti-
116. An anti-bias housing ordinance was introduced in Philadelphia's City Council
on Sept 18, 1958. It was referred to the Committee on Municipal Government.
117. PA. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
118. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§13101-16, 13131, 13133, 13155-57 (Supp. 1957).
119. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13131 (Supp. 1957). The word "thereto" seems
to refer dearly to "municipal functions" and raises no well-founded implication that
the city was given, in addition to power over municipal functions, powers of legislation
as broad as the state has over cities of the first class. Cf. Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv.
84, 92 (1957). That the latter power is the greater of the two is certain: the state
can delegate powers of self-government to cities of the first class, but surely a city
could not adopt this power by itself.
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 13133 (Supp. 1957).
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discrimination in housing,12' regulation by Philadelphia would not face
problems of direct conflict with or pre-emption by state legislation. 2 2 But
the issue remains as to whether or not anti-discrimination in housing legis-
lation is a "municipal function." The state judiciary has not yet given
substantial form to these words, and, in any event, they probably defy
abstract definition.= The few cases dealing with this problem since the
adoption of the city charter concerned administration and personnel of the
city,124 re-zoning, 12 rent control 126 and a local water metering program,
27
and thus do not seem to resolve the problem at hand.m
Despite the frequency of municipal attempts to regulate individual
liberties, little litigation has developed questioning municipal power to do
so. At a time when the "separate but equal" doctrine was accepted,
municipal authority to segregate was upheld in other jurisdictions.129 In
the circuit court opinion in John R. Thompson Co. v. District of Colum-
bia,'30 the majority suggested, in dictum, that the question of the power of
cities to segregate is distinguishable from the question of the power of cities
to enforce nondiscrimination. The distinction was said to rest on the fact
that segregation laws were in accord with custom and usage, and, therefore,
were valid in that they served the purpose of preserving the peace. 13 The
dissenting opinion in Thompson urged that the power to make a law does
not depend upon whether or not the law conforms to local custom. 1 2  The
latter argument appears to be the better of the two views. Where, however,
there was no language in the relevant state legislation which might have
expressly indicated that the municipalities were granted this authority, it
might be argued in support of the majority view that the existence of a long
121. Pennsylvania Rouse Bill 1345, introduced on May 1, 1957, prohibited certain
practices of discrimination in housing. It died in committee. Interviews in the
Philadelphia area indicate that further efforts to pass similar legislation may be
expected.
122. For a discussion of the general subject of this section with emphasis on the
conflict and pre-emption problems relating to New York state and city legislation
against discrimination in housing, see Comment, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 728 (1958). The
ultimate conclusion of that author is contrary to the result reached in this Note.
123. McBAIN, THE LAW AND PRACtiSE OF MUNICnAL HomE RULE 379 (1916);
Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Ohio St. L.J. 18,
25 (1948).
124. E.g., Ebald v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 407, 128 A.2d 352 (1957) ; Shultz v.
Philadelphia, 385 Pa. 79, 122 A.2d 279 (1956); Addison Case, 385 Pa. 48, 122 A.2d
272 (1956) ; Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 93 A2d 834 (1953).
125. Bartle v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 613, 619 (C.P. 1957).
126. Warren v. Philadelphia, 382 Pa. 3$0, 115 A2d 218 (1955).
127. Vitacolonna v. Philadelphia, 2 Pa. D. & C.2d 761 (C.P. 1954), aff'd per
curiam, 382 Pa. 399, 115 A.2d 178 (1955).
128. Philadelphia's Fair Employment Practices Act, PHILADELPHIA, PA., CODE
OF GENERAL ORDINANcES § 9-104 (1954), passed in 1948, preceded Pennsylvania's
legislation on that subject; but the state provision that nothing in its act shall be
deemed to repeal any municipal ordinance relating to the subject would appear to
ratify the city's action, making the law valid even if the city would not otherwise have
the power to enact this legislation. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 43, § 962(b) (Supp. 1957).
129. See cases cited in John R. Thompson Co. v. District of Columbia, 203 F2d
579, 590 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
130. 203 F.2d 579, 590 (D.C. Cir.), reV'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
131. Ibid.
132. 203 F.2d at 601.
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established custom is a reasonable ground to conclude that the power to
segregate was impliedly devolved upon the local governments by the states.
However, one cannot find a customary nondiscriminatory attitude in Penn-
sylvania that could realistically be equated with the custom of segregation
as it once prevailed in some areas. Absent, then, a custom from which
muncipal power can be implied, the search for this power must turn else-
where.
Two significant decisions discussed the power of a municipality to
order restaurant owners to serve persons without regard to race or color.
In the case of Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Utah's supreme court denied
the existence of this authority,133 holding that
"if the statute which authorizes cities to tax, license and regulate res-
taurants were to be construed as empowering the city to pass a civil
rights bill regarding restaurants, the section would also have to be
construed so as to permit civil rights legislation by cities in regard
to all businesses and occupations . .. 14
The opposite view was taken by the United States Supreme Court in the
Thompson case.135 A restaurant anti-discrimination statute was viewed by
that Court as an act relating to municipal affairs of the District of Columbia.
"Regulation of public eating and drinking establishments in the District
has been delegated by Congress to the municipal government from the
very beginning. . . . [T] here is indeed no subject of legislation more
firmly identified with local affairs than the regulation of restaurants." 136
This reasoning might well seem equally applicable to housing legislation,
for it, too, has aspects which commend it to local treatment. Since popula-
tion distribution of minority groups, their housing conditions, housing con-
ditions in general, and the attitudes of the state population may be expected
to vary from locality to locality, the city is perhaps best able to weigh the
advantages and disadvantages that might be expected to flow from the
regulation. Municipal concern with the effective distribution of available
housing is not unlike the considerations which give rise to city zoning
powers. When conditions which bear on an area of potential government
control are found to vary within a state, the very rationales which support
the existence of home rule seem to argue for its regulation by the
municipality.
Undeniably, as noted by the Utah court, such an ordinance contains
aspects of "civil rights" legislation in that concern for the dignity of mem-
bers of minority groups plays a significant part in the legislative determina-
133. 106 Utah 517, 520, 150 P.2d 773, 774 (1944).
134. 106 Utah at 520, 150 P.2d at 774.
135. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
136. 346 U.S. at 113. This answer followed, the Court held, whether the District
was viewed as a territory or a municipality. 346 U.S. at 109. Another aspect of this
case was discussed in text accompanying note 102 .upra.
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tion. But there appears to be no reason why "civil rights" legislation per se
should be excluded from the domain of the municipality-particularly where
home rule provisions indicate a desire to devolve power generously. Even
where, as in Utah, civil rights per se are not considered a municipal func-
tion, it should be recognized that measures similar to the one under con-
sideration serve another purpose also: effective distribution of available
housing. The housing law, being adopted in part to mitigate a local prob-
lem-one dearly within the sphere of control of a local government-should
be categorized as a legitimate muncipal function.
3 7
Should the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decide that anti-discrimina-
tion legislation applied to housing is a "municipal function," some doubt
would arise as to whether or not the state could thereafter ever treat
the subject by general legislation covering Philadelphia. The doubt stems
from the question of whether the source of Philadelphia's home rule is
"constitutional" or "legislative." 138  In the former type the city is given
its powers directly by the state constitution. Although the city may be
required to wait for the legislature to indicate the time at which the granted
power will become operative, the legislature cannot violate the supreme
law of the state by withdrawing or infringing upon the city's powers once
they do become exercisable. Thus, under such a home rule grant, finding
that anti-bias housing legislation is a municipal function would mean that the
subject is exclusively committed to local control. The latter type of home
rule, however, emanates from the legislature, and is subject to withdrawal
or infringement by that body. In the Pennsylvania Constitution the provi-
sion for home rule is "subject . . . to such restrictions, limitations, and
regulations, as may be imposed by the Legislature." -I9 The annotators of
Philadelphia's charter have interpreted the restricting clause to mean only
that home rule could have been doled out gradually by the state legislature,
but any powers once granted are of constitutional origin and cannot be
retracted absent constitutional amendment. 40 Dictum of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and a holding of a common pleas court reach the opposite
conclusion,' 41 and are probably indicative of how the issue will ultimately
be decided in Pennsylvania.'4
137. Pennsylvania courts have been reluctant to decide in favor of municipalities
when a close issue of municipal power arises. Cities have no power to govern other
than that which their parent institutions give them. Reasoning that it is natural for
the state to guard jealously its governing power, the courts have established a pre-
sumption to the effect-that: "Any fair, reasonable doubt as to the existence of power
is resolved by the courts against its existence in the [municipal] corporation, and there-
fore denied . . . . " Lesley v. Kite, 192 Pa. 268, 274, 43 At. 959, 961 (1899). It is
not clear, however, that this rule should or will be applied to a home rule city.
138. Fordham & Asher, Home Ride Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIo ST.
L.J. 18, 19 (1948) ; Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 84, 95 (1957).
139. PA. CoNsr. art. XV, § 1.
140. PHILADELPHIA HoME RuLE CHARTER § 1-100, annot. 3 (1951).
141. McHenry v. Clark, 87 Pa. D. & C. 348, 359 (C.P. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds =ub nomn. Clark v. Meade, 377 Pa. 150, 104 A2d 465 (1954) ; cf. Addison
Case, 385 Pa. 48, 79, 122 A.2d 272, 275-76 (1956) (dictum).
142. If Philadelphia's municipal functions are held irretractable, it is suggested
that they are even more likely to be narrowly defined by the courts on the assumption
that an irretrievable grant would be most conservatively extended.
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V. DUAL JURISDICTION
There are at least two circumstances which might provide a choice of
legislative forum for the passage of anti-bias housing laws. If the power
to pass such a law is a municipal function under a legislative-type home
rule grant, the state government retains the power to withdraw all or a
part of the city's power. Thus, authority to act is vested in both the
central and local legislatures contemporaneously. History suggests a second
and perhaps the most significant way that a choice of forum can arise.
Unless there are highly analogous judicial determinations from which the
city council could decide whether or not it has the power to enact anti-bias
housing legislation, the city can assume that it does and legislate if it desires.
The dearth of case law on municipal civil rights powers has a double-
barreled implication. It indicates, first of all, that few cities will know
whether or not they have the power, and, secondly, that an absence of litiga-
tion may continue over a long period of time, during which period the
municipal law will remain in effect.' 43 These possibilities for a choice of
legislative forum suggest the propriety of an inquiry into the question of
the preferability of enactment of anti-bias legislation by the state or a
municipality.
Assuming two willing legislative bodies, action by the state has to
commend it primarily the fact that it extends to more people. A single
state policy would overcome the fear of local governments that liberal hous-
ing ordinances would instigate an emigration of wealthy taxpayers to less
progressive surrounding communities, 144 although fear of removal to neigh-
boring states may persist.4'
On the other hand, a state-wide need for an anti-bias law may not be
so immediate as it is in a particular city, or for other reasons the state
legislators may be unwilling to treat the subject. In this situation regula-
tion on a municipal level may become desirable. Similarly, state legis-
lation may be less forceful than that sought by a local government, and
municipal action could exemplify the feasibility of stronger legislation, thus
preparing a climate for a revision of the state-wide program. However,
municipal initiation could well have the effect of creating precedent for a
piecemeal approach to the subject, and retard, rather than encourage, action
by the central government. In light of this possibility it would seem that
municipalities should withhold action until there is reasonable indication
that there will not be timely treatment of the problem on a state-wide scale.
143. For example, there has never been litigation testing the constitutionality of
any fair employment practices act.
144. See Address by Mayor of Philadelphia Richardson Dilworth at Philadelphia,
Tribune Charities Dinner, April 17, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University
of Pennsylvania.
145. See text accompanying notes 48-62 supra for a discussion of state legis-
lation, including states surrounding Philadelphia. The avenues of escape may be
reduced quantitatively by the existence of anti-bias legislation in neighboring states
that is equal to or more comprehensive than the legislation of the home state or
qualitatively by anti-bias legislation in surrounding areas that is less comprehensive
than that of the home state.
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VI. PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE "BENIGN QUOTA"
Notwithstanding the removal of legal barriers to integrated public
housing and a nondiscriminatory administrative policy, de facto racial
segregation may continue to flourish. An overwhelming majority of one
ethnic group may occupy a housing development perhaps as holdovers of a
period of practiced segregation, or because of gradual removal of other
racial groups, or a reluctance of different groups to accept the facilities, or
because one group predominates in the segment of the population eligible to
occupy the development. These factors have sometimes resulted in public
housing taking on the appearance of being minority housing. It has been
observed that when, for any of the foregoing reasons, a minority group
occupied an indeterminate but sufficiently large number of the housing
units, non-minority members tend to leave, and de facto segregation is
accentuated. 146 This would appear to result from a repugnance of tenants
to accept minority status in the public housing community when such status
can be avoided in private housing.147 The percentage of minority occupancy
that initiates a withdrawal of other tenants has been denominated the "tip-
ping point." 14 Informed estimates place this point from within six to
about fifty per cent of total occupancy. 49 This wide range is probably the
result of two factors: first, the differing opinions of "guestimators" and sec-
ond, the fact that individual "tipping points" will vary among housing
projects. Among the reasons for variation are such influences as the
intensity of prejudicial feeling in the community, the extent of the supply
of private housing to which emigrants can escape, and the racial composition
of the neighborhood of a housing project. The sugggestion has been made
that government institute a policy of "controlled occupancy," based on an
estimated "tipping point," to maintain a balanced representation of ethnic
groups in each housing project in order to overcome this phenomenon. 50
Euphemistically called "benign quotas," sponsors distinguish them
from plans designed to exclude minorities without concern for minority
welfare.151 This method of eliminating segregation, they urge, would
146. ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 311-12 (1955).
147. Ibid.
148. Letter From Will Maslow, Director of American Jewish Congress, to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June 25, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania.
149. ABR S, op. cit. supra note 146, at 311-12.
150. Although there has been little published on this subject, it is a matter of
current concern among people working with racial problems. Interviews With
Leaders of Social Service Organizations in New York City and Philadelphia, June
and July 1958. Other writing on the subject is in preparation. See Letter From
Frances Levenson, Executive Director, National Committee Against Discrimination
in Housing, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, July 3, 1958, on file in
Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
There is some indication that quotas are, or have been, administratively
enforced. PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY, BASIC POLICIES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
FOR Low INCOME FAMLIES IN PnHLADELPIA 27a (1957); N.Y. Times, May 4,
1958, p. 1, col. 1.
151. ABRAMS, op. cit. stpra note 146, at 311-12.
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benefit minorities in several ways. It would eliminate the feelings of
rejection that are inspired by their living in separation from the rest of the
community. It would help to break down inter-group prejudices by giving
the individuals involved the opportunity to know and understand each
other. It would serve as an exemplification of the feasibility of racially
mixed housing. In cumulation, the benefits described would advance the
cause of complete racial equality.
Enforced quotas are not strange to private housing where they have
met with apparent success, as evidenced by an increasing incidence of
planned interracial developments.',52 However, government adoption of
such a policy raises a host of questions: at the legislative level, is such a
plan desirable; at the administrative level, is it practical; and, of course,
the ultimate question, is such a device constitutional? It should first be
noted that such a plan involves a shift in the emphasis of public housing
legislation from fulfilling need for housing to achievement of completed
quotas. There is a resulting likelihood that needier applicants will often
be rejected in favor of those who can complete quota demands. Fears
must also be overcome that there will be no malignant spread of the use of
quotas under the mere guise of benignity. Furthermore, the moral judg-
ment must be made that it is more desirable for the government to engage
in sponsorship of a form of quota discrimination than to permit the effectua-
tion of de facto segregation. Effective regulation can be anticipated to be
especially difficult both in terms of the basic mechanics of obtaining and
retaining the necessary variety of tenants to maintain the system and in
terms of the necessity of conforming with certain federal administrative
regulations which condition the receipt of federal aid. The mechanical
problems present the lesser of the two burdens. Locating projects in un-
developed or already racially mixed areas rather than homogeneous neigh-
borhoods will avoid isolation of any group. Raising the income limitation
on applicants will make public housing available to a more representative
group of the entire population. Educational and promotional materials can
also be directed mainly to those persons whose presence is needed to main-
tain balances. A preliminary determination of the groups to be represented
may be made and adjustments effected thereafter pursuant to the demands
of experience, agency findings, or court action by those who claim they are
being discriminated against because their groups are not represented.lss
Proper "tipping points" could be based on an estimate of effective propor-
tions for a particular housing development, and subsequently adjusted when
necessary. The more significant hurdle, however, is presented by federal
aid requirements. 4 Federal law sets up certain preferences which must
152. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1958, § 8, p. 1, col. 1.
153. See text accompanying notes 174-77 infra for further consideration of actions
by those who claim they are suffering from discrimination.
154. "Every contract made pursuant to this chapter for annual contributions for
any low-rent housing project shall require that the public housing agency, as among
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be followed in the allotment of living quarters that are built with the aid of
federal funds. First preference is extended generally to families displaced
by destruction of their homes to make way for certain public improvements
or by other public action, including the enforcement of housing standards.
Within this displaced persons group, three different sub-groups of veterans'
families are given an order of priority, all three being placed before non-
veteran families who have been displaced. Second preference is extended
to veterans' families which have not been displaced, but within this group
there is an order of preference for families of different types of veterans.
Unless federal law could be changed to permit more flexibility, fulfillment
of "benign quotas" would have to take place within the framework of
existing priorities.
VII. LEGALITY OF GOVERNMENTAL APPLICATION OF THE
"BENIGN QUOTA"
Agency Regulations
Turning from considerations of the legislative desirability and adminis-
trative practicability, we must next explore the legality of government
application of a "benign quota" program in public housing in terms of the
relevant federal agency regulations which lay down conditions of federal
assistance and in terms of the federal constitution. One of .the basic federal
Public Housing Administration regulations demands a reflection of "equi-
table provision for eligible families of all races determined on the approxi-
mate volume and urgency of their respective needs for such housing." 165
Just what the word "equitable" means in this context is not expressly
indicated, but other regulations hint at what is expected by the agency.
In some regulations, for instance, a color-blind policy is clearly prohibited.
low-income families which are eligible applicants for occupancy in dwellings of given
sizes and at specified rents, shall extend the following preferences in the selection of
tenants:
"First, to families which are to be displaced by any low-rent housing project or
by any public slum-clearance, redevelopment or urban renewal project, or through
action of a public body or court, either through the enforcement of housing stand-
ards or through the demolition, closing, or improvement of dwelling units, or
which were so displaced within three years prior to making application to such
public housing agency for admission to any low-rent housing: Provided, That as
among such projects or actions the public housing agency may from time to time
extend a prior preference or preferences: And provided further, That, as among
families within any such preference group first preference shall be given to families
of disabled veterans whose disability has been determined by the Veterans' Adminis-
tration to be service-connected, and second preference shall be given to families of
deceased veterans and servicemen whose death has been determined by the Veterans'
Administration to be service-connected, and third preference shall be given to families
of other veterans and servicemen;
"Second, to families of other veterans and servicemen and as among such families
first preference shall be given to families of disabled veterans whose disability has
been determined by the Veterans' Administration to be service-connected, and second
preference shall be given to families of deceased veterans and servicemen whose
death has been determined by the Veterans' Administration to be service-connected."
68 Stat. 631 (1954). 42 U.S.C. §1410(g) (Supp. V, 1958).
155. PHA, Low-Rent Housing Manual 102.1, § 1 (1951).
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
One regulation entitled "Racial Equality in Communities with Small Minor-
ity Population" covers situations in which the minority segment of the
population is "inadvertently overlooked" and not provided for in housing
developments. In such a case the Administration requires that the local
authorities "provide housing for eligible minority families" under the
existing circumstances if this is "practical," but if the "program has pro-
gressed beyond the stage where revision is practical [the local authority
must] include in any subsequent program . . . provisions for eligible
racial minority families." 1-6 Another regulation, requiring a nondiscrim-
ination clause in contracts given by local authorities, declares that when
salaries of negro labor employed in housing project construction bear the
same relation to total labor expense in that construction as negro salaries
bear to total labor expense in construction work in the locality of the
projects, it shall be prima facie evidence that the contractor has not dis-
criminated. 157 By thus indicating that negro employment in public housing
construction need not be greater, percentage-wise, than negro employment
in total construction work in the locality, discriminatory action is inhibited
only insofar as it exceeds the intensity that prevails in the community. The
implication of a desire for proportionment among races is strengthened
when these regulations are contrasted with others which show that the
agency knows how to demand unadulterated equality when that is what is
intended, e.g., an order that personnel actions within the Public Hous-
ing Administration and by the local authorities must be taken without
discrimination.15 8
At one time a regulation was in effect which appeared frankly to permit
the establishment of "separate but equal facilities." 159 It has now been
deleted, which might indicate that a gradual change in the attitude of the
Administration is taking place. However, the regulations do provide that
"selection of tenants and the assigning of dwelling units are primarily
matters for local determination . , "160 This would seem to suggest,
when considered against the background of the other regulations discussed,
that the federal agency would not find objection in "local determination"
along lines of "controlled occupancy" so long as the quotas reflect "provi-
sion for . . . all races determined on the approximate volume and urgency
of their respective needs." 161 More difficulty, however, is noted when the
"benign quota" plan is considered in light of constitutional prohibitions.
156. PHA, Low-Rent Housing Manual 102.2 (1951).
157. PHA, Form PHA-2456A, §304 (1955).
158. PHA, Administrative Manual 82-1-1, 82-3-14 (1955).
159. PHA, Low-Rent Housing Manual 207.1 (1949). This regulation declared
that "housing provided for all races shall be of substantially the same quality, services,
facilities and conveniences with respect to all standards and criteria for planning and
designing... ."
160. Id. at 102.1, § 2 (1951).
161. See note 155 mipra; Albert M. Cole, until recently Administrator of the
Housing and Home Finance Agency, stated that the policy of the agency is to support
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Federal Constitution
Supreme Court approval of unprecedented discriminatory action against
Japanese citizens during World War II 16 serves as striking refutation of
the assertion that "our constitution is colorblind." 16 Under the duress
of war and a concomitant press of time, highly unusual and otherwise un-
constitutional limitations were imposed by the federal government.'" In
litigation involving an individual who claims a deprivation of his rights as
a colored person, the courts, by recognizing his claim and framing his
remedy, are indicating an awareness of color distinctions. Proponents of gov-
ernment use of "benign quotas" or "controlled occupancy" would urge that
the Constitution also permits discrimination by the state when its ends are
to preclude racial ghettos, to educate the citizenry to the fact that harmonious
interracial living is possible, and to bring about mutual acceptance, as
individuals, of members of different races: a law motivated by these ideals
is distinguishable from a law that discriminates for the purpose of segrega-
tion and the continuance of racial barriers.
In 1950, Supreme Court attention was directed to an analogous prob-
lem in Hughes v. Superior Court.16 5 The issue involved in that case was
the validity of a state court injunction against the picketing of a retail
store to enforce a demand that the employer hire negro employees in
proportion to the amount of negro trade at the store. The Court upheld
the order. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, noted some of
the problems to which a quota system gives birth, and indicated a judicial
attitude towards such a program that may prove significant in the evaluation
of the validity of "controlled occupancy":
"To deny California the right to ban picketing in the circum-
stances of this case would mean that there could be no prohibition of
the pressure of picketing to secure proportional employment on an-
cestral grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of
Germans in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans
in San Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York, and
local law whether it prohibits discrimination or enforces segregation. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 14, 1958, p. 46, col. 1. For a discussion of state power to do the latter, see text
accompanying notes 10-28 supra.
162. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
163. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
164. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). That the federal government may be able to discriminate
in circumstances in which the states could not was implied in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954). "The Fifth Amendment . . . does not contain an equal protection
clause as does the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the
concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American
ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The 'equal protection of the laws'
is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than 'due process of law,' and,
therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases." 347 U.S.
at 499. Perhaps the superior power is limited to some areas of predominant federal
concern, such as war.
165. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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so on through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations
in various cities. States may well believe that such constitutional
sheltering would inevitably encourage use of picketing to compel em-
ployment on the basis of racial discrimination. In disallowing such
picketing States may act under the belief that otherwise community
tensions and conflicts would be exacerbated." 166
Justice Reed, concurring, saw the case as picketing for "discrimination in
favor of persons of the negro race." 167 Obviously this case does not
represent a holding that a state may not constitutionally enforce its own
quota system. However, the Court pointed out that "the right to work
[would be] dependent not on fitness for the work nor on an equal right of
all, regardless of race, . .. but on membership in a particular race"; 168
and no recognition was given to the theory that benefits that might flow
from the proportional hiring plan to the minority or majority groups dis-
tinguish this type of discrimination from any other. Rather, the tone of
the opinion indicates a clearly unfavorable reaction to proportional equality.
Inspection of judicial thought in another area, that of racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of a jury, evidences a similar rejection of the concept
of proportional representation. In Cassel v. Texas 16 9 the petitioner, who
was a negro, sought a reversal of his conviction of murder on the ground
that his indictment by the grand jury was invalid because negroes had been
purposefully excluded from service thereon. He contended that, although
some members of his race had been admitted to service on the jury, for
twenty-one consecutive lists (during which period the petitioner was in-
dicted) jury service by negroes had been limited to not more than one on
each grand jury. This number was proportional to the negro population
in the county. Reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court said:
"[P] roportional representation of races on a jury is not a constitutional
requisite . . .. Obviously the number of races and nationalities ap-
pearing in the ancestory of our citizens would make it impossible to
meet a requirement of proportional representation. Similarly, since
there can be no exclusion of negroes as a race and no discrimination
because of color, proportional limitation is not permissible. That con-
clusion is compelled by the United States Code, Title 18, § 243, based
on § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875." 170
166. 339 U.S. at 464.
167. 339 U.S. at 469.
168. 339 U.S. at 463-64.
169. 339 U.S. 282 (1950).
170. 339 U.S. at 286-87. The act referred to declares, "No citizen possessing
all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified
for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, being an
officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of
jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not
more than $5,000."
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The concurring opinion did not deem it necessary to rely on the statute but
declared that:
"The prohibition of the Constitution against discrimination because
of color does not require in and of itself the presence of a Negro on a
jury. But neither is it satisfied by Negro representation arbitrarily
limited to one. It is not a question of presence on a grand jury nor
absence from it. The basis of selection cannot consciously take color
into account. Such is the command of the Constitution." 171
In a later case, Brown v. Allen,'72 the majority recognized that statutory
protection was unnecessary to prohibit proportional limitation in this area.
"Discriminations against a race by barring or limiting citizens of
that race from participation in jury service are odious to our thought
and our Constitution. [Cases cited.] Such discrimination is for-
bidden by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 243, and has been treated as a denial
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment -to an accused,
of the race against which such discrimination is directed." '73
The objection to proportional representation that is expressed in the
Hughes, Cassel, and Brown cases has two bases. One is the practical
difficulty of attaining proportional representation because of the numerous
ethnic groups in our country. The other, present in the latter two cases, is
a constitutional restriction on barring or limiting citizens from participation
in jury service. What is the relative significance of these two factors and
what can be distilled from them that is pertinent to the legality of a "benign
quota"?
The practical difficulty, mentioned in -the Hughes and the Cassel cases,
of attaining proportional representation is perhaps overemphasized. In a
more recent case, Hernandez v. TexasY 4 a person of Mexican descent
wanted to prove that he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial
because persons of that descent were systematically excluded from jury
service. To prove this, he had only circumstantial evidence: the absence
of Mexicans from juries for a protracted period of time. Such evidence
might have supported an inference of discrimination in the case of Negroes,
for example, who are known to be a common object of discriminatory action
by whites, but here the petitioner was held to have an initial burden, to
substantiate his charge of group discrimination, to prove that persons of
Mexican descent are considered to constitute a separate class, distinct from
whites, in the county in which he was indicted."75 Here the Court had no
171. 339 U.S. at 295.
172. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
173. 344 U.S. at 470-71.
174. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
175. 347 U.S. at 479.
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING
difficulty in making available the means to assert a claim of discrimination
to "Poles in Buffalo, . . . Germans in Milwaukee, . . . Portuguese in
New Bedford," 171 etc. It is not really impossible, then, to establish the
claims of small minority groups, whether this is done directly or circum-
stantially. If the latter method is necessary, then once a "separate class"
in a community is shown to exist, and to have been discriminated against
by not having been assigned a quota, that class could be assigned its alloca-
tion of living units with consideration of its size in the community as a
whole, the number of eligible members of the class who need or desire public
housing, and the "tipping point" problem.
177
But the rejection of proportional limitation in the jury selection cases
was not made to rest alone on the impracticality of establishing claims of
discriminatory action. A constitutional restriction on proportional limita-
tion was also relied on. What is the nature of this objection? It does not
appear that a defendant would be more subject to the unfairness of racial
discrimination by jurors if his class were proportionately represented on
the jury that tried him. The claims of denial of equal protection because
of systematic exclusion of one's own class lead to the opposite assumption.
And, if a reasonably fair balance of classes was struck, the state, too, could
have no claim of prejudice. It is submitted, therefore, that the rationale
of the constitutional prohibition is a denial of the state's power to make
racial classification per se, notwithstanding the fact that in a jury situation,
such classification, for purposes of proportional representation, might lead
to a balancing of potential prejudice and hence more "fairness." The sub-
stance of the rulings would seem to be that expressed by the concurring
opinion in the Cassel case: "The basis of selection cannot consciously take
176. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 464 (1950).
177. Cases from the "separate but equal" era provide no solutions to the problems
presented by the existence of and provision for many small ethnic groups. Division
was then made on a white and non-white basis only and each small ethnic group was
not entitled to its own facilities. This practice was upheld by the Court in Gong Lurn
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). It is doubtful that "controlled occupancy" exponents,
sincerely interested in the promotion of minority welfare, would want to initiate such
general classification as it may cause the rights of smaller minorities to be over-
looked. Furthermore, although employing broad classifications in "controlled occu-
pancy" would reduce the problems of administration, dual classification would not
be necessary to avoid the expense of providing additional sets of facilities since the
plan is designed to have all groups share all facilities in common. Under any white
and non-white division there is still the possibility that a Chinese, for example,
although purportedly provided for by the non-white classification, could be discrimi-
nated against by not being admitted to the non-white facilities. It does not seem that
this kind of trouble arose in the "separate but equal" era. The oriental plaintiff
in Gong Li n complained not of being denied the use of any facilities but of hav-
ing to use non-white facilities. But there is greater potential for this type of
discrimination in "controlled occupancy" than there was in situations calling for
"separate but equal" facilities. In the latter, everyone who came generally had to
be served, albeit each in his own place. There was no selectivity. Both public
housing and the "benign quota," however, are selective. In any course of events
some must be turned away, and as soon as there is justification for turning people
away, a temptation to turn "certain" people away may arise. But the method of
proof established in Hernandez could be used as well under a dual classification
system-to show discriminatory exclusion, as it could be under a multi-classification
system-to show discrimination by failure. to establish a particular class.
1959]
546 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
color into account. Such is the command of the Constitution." 178  As
previously suggested,179 the extension of the principle of the school segrega-
tion cases 18 to public golf courses, 81 public swimming facilities,182
parks,1ss local transportation, 8 4 and governmental facilities 10 tends to
substantiate this conclusion.
Public housing cases have also treated the question of governmental
imposition of quotas. The earliest litigation arose in Pennsylvania in
1941 186 and involved the following facts. The Philadelphia Housing Au-
thority had received 3,263 applications from white and 1,040 from colored
prospective tenants of a 1,000 living unit project, and at the initiation of the
suit 702 white and fifty-six colored tenants were selected. The court, on
motion to dismiss the complaint, denied a preliminary injunction of the
use of "quota eligibility." 187 The authority's effort to preserve "existing
neighborhood patterns" was held to have complied with the "separate but
equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson.8 8 Clearly, the court was favorably
impressed by the additional fact that allocation in all housing projects was
sixty per cent colored and forty per cent white while the need was in the
reverse proportion. As late as 1954 the same view was adopted by a Texas
court.18 9 Provision for 1,500 white, 1,500 negro and 500 Latin American
units in a public housing development was held to be consistent with the
demands of the fourteenth amendment, but no claim on behalf of Latin
Americans was discussed.
In 1953 a contrary line of authority was initiated. Speaking in Banks
v. Housing Authority,'° ° the California court took issue with the "neigh-
borhood pattern" quota system accepted in the Philadelphia case. It re-
178. 339 U.S. 282, 295 (1950). But see State v. Green, 221 La. 713, 60 So. 2d
208 (1952) (purposeful inclusion of negroes on a jury panel does not constitute dis-
crimination against a colored accused in absence of a showing that there was a
planned limitation upon the number of negroes to be chosen).
179. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
180. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954).
181. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350
U.S. 879 (1955).
182. Dawson v. Mayor, 220 F2d 386 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877
(1955).
183. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th
Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 79 Sup. Ct 99 (1958); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 223 F2d
93 (5th Cir.), aff'd per curialm, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) ; see Muir v. Louisville Park
Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), Vacating 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
184. Gayle v. Browder, 142 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S.
903 (1956).
185. Sharp v. Lucky, 252 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958).
186. Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (E.D. Pa. 1941).
187. Ibid.
188. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
189. Miers v. Housing Authority, 266 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. Civ. App.), certified
questions answered, 153 Tex. 236, 266 S.W.2d 842 (1954) (questions related to dif-
ferent issues).
190. 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P2d 668 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 974 (1954).
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jected the housing authority's policy as unconstitutional racial zoning
comparable to that in Buchanan v. Warley; 191 there was virtual state
sponsorship of -the restrictive covenants that may have established the
patterns, and hence a flouting of the principles laid down in Shelley
v. Kraemer.92 New Jersey courts, having taken an early lead in elimina-
tion of segregation in public housing,'19 also reacted unfavorably toward a
quota system based on population ratios, since the quota assumed negroes
to be different from other citizens. The plan was declared unconstitutional
despite a defense that it was needed to prevent negroes from receiving more
than their share of the housing offered.194
The United States Supreme Court case of McCabe v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry.19 5 was relied on in the Banks case and not distinguished by those
courts which sustained "separate but equal" treatment in public housing.
This helps to explain the difference in the results that were reached.
McCabe was concerned with the question of whether any dining space on
trains had to be made available for negroes. The Court said,
"Whether or not particular facilities shall be provided may doubtless
be conditioned upon there being a reasonable demand therefore, but, if
facilities are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons
traveling under like conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual
who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws... 11196
This principle was more recently amplified in the case of Henderson v.
United States.197 Here the question involved was "whether . . . rules
and practices, which divide each dining car so as to allot ten tables exclu-
sively to white passengers and one table exclusively to Negro passengers,
and which call for a curtain or partition between that table and the
others," 198 violated a federal statute making it unlawful "to subject any
particular person . . . to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or dis-
advantage in any respect whatsoever .... " 199 The Court, finding a
violation of the statute, wrote in terms that may be applied to controlled
occupancy policies:
191. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
192. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See text accompanying note 3 supra.
193. Seawell v. MacWithey, 2 N.J. Super. 255, 63 A.2d 542 (Ch.), rev'd on other
ground.s, 2 N.J. 563, 67 A2d 309 (1949).
194. Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632 (Super. Ct. 1954);
cf. Kankakee County Housing Authority v. Spurlock, 3 Ill. 2d 277, 120 N.E2d 561
(1954), wherein defendant housing authority's plans indicated that a 66.7% white
and a 33.3% non-white occupancy would prevail in a housing project. The court
held that the plan was necessary to meet FHA requirements of a numerical estimate
of the distribution needed to achieve racial equity and that it would be presumed in
advance that the authority would not unconstitutionally enforce racial segregation.
195. 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
196. 235 U.S. at 161-62.
197. 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
198. 339 U.S. at 818.
199. Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 902 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1952).
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"Other Negroes who present themselves are compelled to await a
vacancy at that table, although there may be many vacancies elsewhere
in the diner. The railroad thus refuses to extend to those passengers
the use of its existing and unoccupied facilities. The rules impose
a like deprivation upon white passengers whenever more than 40 of
them seek to be served at the same time and the table reserved for
Negroes is vacant." 
200
The "impact" of the statute involved has been called "similar to that of
the [fourteenth] Amendment." 201 In any event, the case draws attention
to the deprivation that would be caused the individual, otherwise eligible,
who would be refused public housing because the quota for his class has
been filled, and, as expressed in McCabe, "it is the individual who is en-
titled to the equal protection of the laws . ,, 202
The suggestion may be offered that use of the "benign quota" is dis-
tinguishable from other forms of racial discrimination because of the effect
which results from the plan, and that the courts have often looked to the
effect of legislation when searching for subtle forms of discrimination.203
Could not the benign results achieved by these quotas afford a distinction
leading to their acceptability? An affirmative answer overlooks the
"benign" quality of earlier legislative attempts at racial classification that
have been rejected. There is no doubt that conflicts arise, though not at all
consistently, upon the entrance of a minority member into a previously
exclusive neighborhood.20 4  Nor would it appear irrational 2 05 for a legis-
lature to prohibit such entrances as a preventive measure. Such an effort
would thus have its benign effect, too. It was recognized by the Court in
Buchanan v. Warley:
"It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the public
peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is and important
as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accom-
plished by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected
by the Federal Constitution." 
206
200. 339 U.S. at 824-25.
201. Banks v. Housing Authority, 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 14, 260 P.2d 668, 676
(Dist Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
202. 235 U.S. at 161-62.
203. Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). The former case discusses the fifteenth amendment but originated a maxim
often applied to equal protection cases: "The Amendment nullifies sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes of discrimination." Lane v. Wilson, mtpra at 275. See
e.g., Ludley v. Board of Supervisors, 150 F. Supp. 900, 903 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd,
252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958) : "The fact that a transparent device is used [to effect
segregation] . . . does not make the legislation less unconstitutional."
204. -A mRs, Fo BInDDN NEIGHBORS 81-136 (1955).
205. Legislative judgment is presumed to be supported by facts known to the
legislature unless it is possible to say that the legislative choice is without rational
basis. South Carolina Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 191-92 (1938).
206. 245 U.S. at 81. The zoning ordinance under consideration was titled: "An
ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between white and colored races in the
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But exponents of "controlled occupancy" might urge that the benignity of
racial zoning was spurious, that minorities prefer to have the opportunity
to mix with the rest of the community even if the mixing entails some risk
of conflict. Assuming that argument to be true, it still cannot be used to
distinguish "benign" racial zoning from "benign" housing quotas. This is
so because it does not appear that "benign quotas" are unqualifiedly benign.
Reasonable arguments can be made, and doubtless with the support of some
minority group individuals, that "benign quotas" will work more harm
than good. For instance, some feel that governmental imposition of quotas
is in itself undesirable. Some are displeased by the fact that needier
minority applicants for housing will sometimes be rejected in favor of the
less needy majority members in order to fill quotas. If it be recognized,
then, that "benign quotas" may have a deleterious effect on minorities, it
will be observed that the stand of "benign quota" sponsors boils down to a
request that the courts decide the issue of benignity in their favor in order
to overcome the precedent set by racial zoning cases. In view of our
society's obvious lag in mastering an understanding of the sociological fac-
tors that would be involved in a determination of whether or not the
"benign quota" is benign, can the courts reach a well-founded determina-
tion of that issue? Unless such a measure can be found to be benign to an
extremely high degree, it is suggested that they cannot. Perhaps this
rationale underlies the theory of the World War II Japanese cases,20
which are of questionable authority today, permitting discrimination, and
the racial zoning decisions. The benefits to be derived from a government
inspired discrimination must be overwhelmingly significant and over-
whelmingly obvious if it is to meet constitutional requirements. The
"benign quota" clearly does not meet those standards.
The second Brown case, °8 in its suggestion of revision of school dis-
tricts 209 to implement the original decision, does, however, offer an implica-
tion that compulsory integration is a permitted state function. However,
most courts have interpreted the decision as not calling for active integra-
tion,210 rather, only an end to practices aimed at compulsory segregation,
although active integration has been ambiguously referred to,21 ' and New
City of Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare
by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of separate
blocks for residences, places of abode and places of assembly by white and colored
people respectively." 245 U.S. at 70.
207. See text accompanying note 162 supra.
208. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
209. Id. at 300.
210. E.g., Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dist., 241 F.2d 230, 233
(5th Cir. 1957), quoting from Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C.
1955); see Paul, The School Segregation Decision, LAw AND GOVERNAMINT 94-95
(1954). 1, 2 RACE REx. L. REP. (1956, 1957) contain an extensive collection of
reported and unreported court orders relating to school segregation and the immediate
question.
211. E.g., Evans v. State Bd. of Educ., 149 F. Supp. 376 (D. Del. 1957) (order
to submit plan of integration) ; Cameron v. Board of Educ., 182 Kan. 39, 42, 318 P.2d
988, 990 (1957) (order to integrate grade schools). Later, however, in a connected
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York City's plans for re-zoning of school districts have mentioned promotion
of integration as an important factor to consider.2 12 Re-zoning which elim-
inates racial factors and considers only geographical and population density
factors may be all that Brown calls for, and, indeed, if any racial classifica-
tion is forbidden, all that is allowed. But if "gerrymandering" to insure
integrated schools is allowable, the argument may be made that provision of
public housing on a quota basis is necessary to avoid de facto school segrega-
tion. Yet forcing a student's attendance at one mixed school instead of
another, in order to assure his adequate education, does not rise to the height
of injury caused an eligible citizen who is denied public housing because of
his color. And if re-zoning on racial lines is permissible, quotas lose the
press of necessity that might otherwise be urged to justify their use to
resolve school segregation problems.
In summary, it would appear that the "benign quota" must fall to the
constitutional demands that government, except possibly in situations of
dire emergency, may not take race into account as a standard for action.
Furthermore, the adoption of a "benign quota" system should be prohibited
because it requires that some individuals suffer exclusion from housing
because the quota for their ethnic group is filled. This violates the con-
stitutional precept that it is the individual who is entitled to the equal
protection of the laws. These constitutional requirements have never
yielded to the claim that they do not apply to acts of a benign nature. The
answer to the proposition that the "benign quota" is distinguishable from
plans that were alleged to be benign but were not in fact seems to be that
this quota is also not clearly untainted, surely not pure enough to meet the
high standards demanded to sustain government inspired discrimination.
This should leave the "benign quota" on no better footing than admittedly
invalid racial zoning laws.
"Controlled occupancy" does not find justification as a necessary means
of implementing the school segregation cases. There is no indication that
the state governments can take positive steps to integrate the schools as
opposed to merely ending practices aimed at compulsory segregation.
However, even if the governments can take such positive measures, they
would seem limited to methods, such as re-zoning of school districts, which
have the least potential for inflicting injury.
P.G.A.
M. C. G.
case, the Delaware District Court refers to a plan of desegregation. Evans v.
Buchanan, 152 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D. Del. 1957). Similarly, at pretrial conference a
federal district court approved a local housing .authority's "Plan of Integration." The
plan permitted applicants to request occupancy in any project and the housing authority
proposed to consider the requests without regard to race or color and to endeavor
to meet the desires of all applicants. But "in considering such requests, the Commis-
sion will not compel a White applicant against his wishes to occupy a unit in a
project which is occupied predominantly by Negro tenants nor [vice versa] ... "
Eleby v. Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n, 2 RAcE REr. L. REP. 815, 816 (1957)
(W.D. Ky.).
212. 2 RAcE REu. L. REP. 1037, 1038 (1957); N.Y. Times, July 27, 1957, p. 1,
col. 5.
